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European Elections: More Surprises Ahead? 
From the editor: With the UK referendum and US election in hindsight, whether this 
year’s European elections will deliver more surprises is Top of Mind. At least one 
potential outcome—the election of Euroskeptic Marine Le Pen in France—would likely 
have serious consequences for both markets and the future of Europe (think 
redenomination risk and Frexit fears). Given the high stakes, we dig into Le Pen’s 
platform, voter base, and prospects for winning, including in an interview with political 
expert Nonna Mayer. We also interview Pascal Lamy—an early architect of the EU—who 
calls the current political environment Europe’s worst crisis in 60 years. Sharing Lamy’s 
concerns, our own Huw Pill outlines the challenges facing mainstream parties even if 
they do prevail as we expect. Lastly, while market fears in the run-up to Trump have (so 
far) proved unfounded, we warn that this would likely not be the case with a Le Pen win. 
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 You simply can’t compare 
[Donald Trump’s] situation to that 
of Marine Le Pen, who is still 
struggling to overcome the legacy 
of her father and whose party is 
still not seen as capable to 
govern.” 
Nonna Mayer 
 
 There is no doubt that the 
election of Le Pen would be 
interpreted as the third act of a 
Greek tragedy, which started with 
Brexit, and was then followed by 
Trump… this is the biggest crisis 
[Europe has] seen yet.” 
Pascal Lamy 
 
 …[In] contrast to the focus 
of many market participants on 
political developments in the 
coming weeks, the future of the 
Euro area is likely to be 
determined over a period of years 
rather than months.” 
Huw Pill 
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Macro news and views 
 
 
 
 
 
US Japan 
Latest GS proprietary datapoints/major changes in views 
• Following the strong February jobs report, we pulled forward 
our expectations for rate hikes to March, June, and 
September from March, September, and December.  
• We also changed our forecast for the start of balance-sheet 
normalization to 4Q2017 from mid-2018.  
Datapoints/trends we’re focused on 
• Upside surprises to data, raising our average CAI for the last 
3 mo. to the fastest pace of growth since late 2014 (3.6%). 
• Healthcare legislation and its impact on tax reform timing. 
Latest GS proprietary datapoints/major changes in views 
• No major changes in views. 
Datapoints/trends we’re focused on 
• The first positive core CPI (ex. fresh food) print in nearly a 
year (0.1% yoy); we expect a continued modest uptrend. 
• The sharp rise in capex (+8.4% qoq ann.) in Q4. 
• New rules that open the door to PM Shinzo Abe leading his 
political party—and potentially the government—until 2021.  
• Steady BOJ policy; we currently see no urgent need for 
further easing and expect no action at the March meeting. 
From “long shot” to “fully priced” 
Market expectations for a March rate hike, %; US MAP index (rhs) 
Positive territory 
Japan CPI inflation, % yoy 
  
Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: MIC.  
Europe Emerging Markets (EM) 
Latest GS proprietary datapoints/major changes in views 
• We raised our Euro area Q1 growth forecast to 0.5% qoq 
from 0.4% qoq on strong sentiment and survey indicators, 
which we believe reflect stronger underlying momentum. 
Datapoints/trends we’re focused on 
• Political risks as voters in the Netherlands and France go to 
the polls on March 15 and April 22, respectively.  
• The recent passage of the Brexit bill by UK parliament, 
clearing the way for PM May to trigger Article 50. 
• A softening of UK PMIs and our UK CAI since December. 
  
Latest GS proprietary datapoints/major changes in views 
• We raised our China Q1 growth forecast to 6.3% qoq ann. 
from 5.5% on a larger-than-expected rebound in fiscal 
spending and ongoing upside surprises to global activity.  
• We lowered our FY18 India growth forecast to 7.5% yoy 
from 8.6%, reflecting a smaller rebound following the milder-
than-expected impact on Q4 GDP from demonetization.  
Datapoints/trends we’re focused on 
• The impact of a faster Fed hiking cycle across the EM space; 
in our view, Mexico and Turkey will be among the most 
affected, given their relatively weak inflation anchors. 
Looking up 
Euro area composite PMI, 50+ indicates expansion 
Fiscal flip 
Change of China’s on-budget fiscal spending to GDP ratio, % 
  
Source: IHS Markit, Haver Analytics.  Source: CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 
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We provide a brief snapshot on the most important economies for the global markets 
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With the unexpected results of the UK referendum and US 
election in the rearview mirror, whether the chock-full 
European election calendar this year—kicking off with 
tomorrow’s general election in the Netherlands, historically a 
political bell-weather—will deliver additional surprises is Top of 
Mind. This is especially the case because at least one potential 
outcome, the election of Euroskeptic Marine Le Pen to the 
French presidency, presents redenomination risk that would 
likely have severe economic and market consequences, and 
could prove to be the death-knell for the European project. 
That said, movements driven by Euroskepticism and “anti-
establishment” sentiment will play a role in all of Europe’s key 
elections this year; besides this week’s Dutch election and 
upcoming French elections (April 23, 1st round; May 7, 2nd 
round; legislative elections in June), elections in Germany 
(September 24) and potentially Italy (TBD; see pgs. 8-9 for 
details) are also on the horizon. On some level, the “populist” 
political trends in these countries are nothing new; strong 
populist influences have ebbed and flowed in Europe over time. 
But this tide has again swelled in recent years for both 
economic and socio-cultural reasons, as we first laid out in our 
April 2015 Top of Mind: Populism, Parties and Politics as well 
as our June 2016 Top of Mind: Political Uncertainty. (See map 
on pg. 19 of this issue for a summary of related indicators.) 
To be clear, we don’t think Euroskeptic forces will win control 
of government in any of the upcoming elections. But as GS 
Chief European Economist Huw Pill argues, even that result 
should be far from comforting for proponents of the European 
vision. In his view, mainstream European parties are caught in a 
trap, with needed reforms likely to draw ire from both ends of 
the political spectrum. The upshot: Unless mainstream 
politicians use their (expected) wins this year to capitalize on 
the favorable macro environment and move swiftly to 
overcome voter concerns, Euroskeptic threats will continue to 
rise and support for European integration will further erode. 
Pascal Lamy, an architect of the EU as former Chief of Staff for 
European Commissioner Jacques Delors in the 1980s/90s and 
former Director General of the WTO, is similarly concerned 
about the outlook for Europe, calling the current crisis the 
worst since the signing of the Treaty of Rome 60 years ago. In 
his words, a victory by Le Pen in the French race would be the 
“third act of a Greek tragedy” that began with Brexit and 
Trump, and would likely mark the beginning of the end for the 
EU and the euro. (But even if she loses, the EU must become 
less “frigid” to reinvigorate the European project, he says.) 
At first glance, much of Le Pen’s ability to deliver on anti-
European campaign promises would hinge on the presence of 
her party, the Front National (FN), in parliament, which is likely 
to be limited even after the legislative elections (see pg. 14). Le 
Pen would thus face serious obstacles to pursuing the key 
market concern: a referendum on “Frexit” (which polls suggest 
the French public would not support). That said, her election 
could be shocking enough to upend France’s institutional 
dynamics, making what follows hard to predict. And even 
beyond the question of “Frexit,” the reality that many of the 
European Council’s key decisions must be unanimous leaves 
little doubt that a Le Pen win would be bad news for the EU.  
The populist pull 
Select populist parties’ share of the vote, %*  
 
*Presidential elections in France, parliamentary elections elsewhere.  
Source: NSD European Election Database, government websites. 
Given the systemic risk that Le Pen presents, we dig into her 
platform and motivations in an interview with Nonna Mayer, an 
expert on the FN at Sciences Po. Mayer notes that Le Pen’s 
success in uniting the far-right around her anti-immigrant 
“national priority” platform is unprecedented, and believes that 
any softening in her Euroskeptic tone is just a strategy to win 
votes. But Mayer agrees with the consensus that a Le Pen win 
is very unlikely. Of course, we’ve all heard that before… and for 
what it’s worth, she cautions that a record-low share of French 
voters is decided at this stage, making polls even less reliable. 
But she also insists that Le Pen and Trump’s situations are 
simply different (Le Pen is a true outsider; Trump is not). 
Our own European Economist, Pierre Vernet, dives further into 
the FN’s support base by comparing election results for nearly 
30,000 French municipalities with socio-demographic variables 
and income levels, using satellite-recorded light intensity as a 
proxy for economic activity. He confirms that Marine Le Pen’s 
pull is strongest in areas that are (1) farther from major cities, 
and have (2) smaller economies and (3) high socio-cultural 
heterogeneity. On this basis, he warns that the populist pull is 
likely to extend well beyond the 2017 election. 
As for market implications, if there is one thing that Brexit and 
Trump have taught us, it’s that unexpected political outcomes 
are one thing, and the markets’ reaction to them is another. 
Nevertheless, Francesco Garzarelli, GS Co-Head of Global 
Markets Research and Peter Oppenheimer, GS Chief Equity 
Strategist, believe a surprise victory by Le Pen would likely 
bring about dislocations in EMU bond markets and a sell-off in 
risk assets, since euro redenomination risk leaves her 
presidency a more systemic risk than Brexit/Trump. If Le Pen 
loses, on the other hand, relief rallies might ensue. 
We close with GS Senior European Economist Alain Durré’s 
early look at elections in Germany, where the question is not 
which candidate is more Euroskeptic, but, paradoxically, which 
is more pro-Europe—with important consequences for the 
future of European integration.  
Allison Nathan, Editor  
Email: allison.nathan@gs.com    
Tel:  212-357-7504   
Goldman, Sachs & Co.    
 
For related coverage, see our European elections page on GS360. 
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Huw Pill argues that market concerns about 
immediate election risks are perhaps 
overdone, but that political risk and its impact 
on Europe won’t diminish anytime soon 
As elsewhere among the advanced economies, European 
electorates are disturbed by the nature and pace of economic 
and social change wrought by liberalization, globalization, and 
technological change. For many, the process of European 
integration is both a source and an amplifier of these underlying 
forces. As a result, disgruntled voters see European institutions 
as scapegoats for the disruption they face. Looking to avoid the 
blame themselves, national governments often encourage such 
thinking. Euroskepticism therefore draws support both from 
voters who feel “left behind” by the pace of economic change 
(largely from the traditional political left); and from voters 
concerned by the social challenges posed by immigration and 
multiculturalism, as well as the loss of national sovereignty to 
supranational bodies (largely from the traditional right). 
Fragmentation on multiple dimensions 
Political parties organized according to their ideologies/positions 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.  
As a result, political allegiances are becoming more 
complicated, and political alignments are evolving. At least in 
principle, there is potential for the emergence of a Euroskeptic 
coalition that draws support across the traditional left/right 
spectrum. Paralleling the surprise vote for Brexit in the UK and 
unexpected election of President Trump in the US, electoral 
outcomes in Europe may be becoming more difficult to predict. 
The stakes are high… 
Speaking in broad-brush terms, the political surprises in the 
Anglo-Saxon world last year passed off with little lasting impact 
on financial markets or adverse effect on the economy (at least 
thus far). But the potential disruption stemming from an 
explicitly Euroskeptic government taking office in a 
systemically-relevant Euro area country would be profound—in 
some cases, possibly even existential—for the single currency.  
 
While Mr. Draghi’s famous commitment to do “whatever it 
takes” to preserve the euro has proved remarkably efficient in 
containing self-fulfilling, market-driven speculative attacks 
against the integrity of the Euro area, the effectiveness of this 
backstop in the face of a political decision to exit the euro is 
open to question.  
The credibility of a commitment to deploy ECB facilities in 
potentially unlimited amounts in support of a country whose 
government has a political mandate to abandon the euro—and 
redenominate liabilities to the rest of Europe in a new (and 
weaker) currency—is (predictably) low. We have empirical 
experience of such a dynamic (even if it was ultimately arrested 
by a new bailout program): Greece’s flirtation with Grexit in 
mid-2015. That is not a happy precedent. Notwithstanding 
“whatever it takes,” we saw capital controls, blocked bank 
deposits and economic chaos in Greece. Market participants 
are thus understandably perturbed by today’s political risks.  
…but the likelihood is low 
Viewed from afar, European political risks look daunting. 
Indeed, they are hard to characterize and understand: binary in 
nature and complex in character. Closer to home, though, such 
political risks appear less threatening, at least for now. After 
many unfortunate experiences with populism in the twentieth 
century, European political institutions have evolved in a way 
that creates a high hurdle to a populist government taking 
office. Institutional specifics vary from country to country, but 
whether via the strict system of proportional representation 
that operates in the Netherlands or the two-round presidential 
election employed in France, scope exists for a mainstream 
“grand coalition” to emerge to defeat the populist candidate. 
While Euroskeptics may (and do, at least in the polls) achieve a 
plurality of votes, they are not yet close to winning a majority of 
votes (the 50%+1) that would confer real political power.  
Such is the conventional wisdom in Europe—a wisdom we 
broadly agree with. Concerns expressed from outside Europe 
about political risks to the Euro area may be overstated.  
A plurality may raise concerns… 
Polling for the 1st round of the French presidential election, % 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Ifop, BVA, Odox, Harris 
Interactive, Kantar Sofres-OnePoint, Elabe, Ifop-Fiducial.  
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…but does not guarantee a majority 
Scenarios for the 2nd round of the French presidential election, % 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Ifop, BVA, Odox, Harris 
Interactive, Kantar Sofres-OnePoint, Elabe, Ifop-Fiducial. 
Caution against complacency 
Still, there are several reasons to guard against complacency. 
First, even if the risk of an explicitly Euroskeptic government 
remains low at present, the consequences of such an outcome 
would be substantial, to say the least. Given the systemic 
nature of such an event, the spillovers across countries—both 
within the Euro area and outside—would be significant. Pricing 
the underlying risk or hedging against it raises questions that go 
beyond our normal experience and models. 
Second, conventional wisdom can be (and has been) wrong, 
especially with regards to politics and public opinion. Recent 
experience in the UK and US is ample demonstration of that. 
Lightning can strike twice, or even three times. 
Third, even if they do not enter or form the government, the 
rise of Euroskeptic populists is undoubtedly influencing the 
wider political debate in most European countries. To protect 
their electoral base against erosion from the populists, 
mainstream parties are embracing some of their 
preoccupations and concerns. A more nationalistic and 
protectionist approach to European relations may result. 
Fourth, the “grand coalition” governments created to stem the 
populist rise are unlikely to have a coherent agenda. By nature, 
they are creations of circumstances rather than conviction. 
Their ability to deliver necessary but controversial policy 
initiatives—such as the governance and structural reforms 
required to make the Euro area more workable—is uncertain. 
Fifth, as result of the above, mainstream governments formed 
in the face of populist insurgencies may find it difficult to 
overcome the underlying economic and institutional 
weaknesses that fueled the rise of populism in the first place. If 
they are unable to find and implement solutions to the 
challenges posed by the economic and social dislocations 
stemming from globalization and technological change, these 
governments will be threatened with further loss of popularity 
and legitimacy. Ultimately, the populist vote will gain further: 
Unless macroeconomic performance improves and social 
concerns abate, the populists will win in the end. 
A dangerous trap 
Viewed through this lens, Europe is caught in a trap. The rise of 
populism is both a cause and a consequence of this trap. On 
one side, mainstream governments inevitably find it hard to 
implement necessary reforms in the face of vociferous 
opposition from populist parties. Efforts to deregulate the labor 
market (and thereby expose previously protected workers from 
the consequences of international competition) draw the ire of 
the populist left. Transfers of sovereignty from the national 
level to European institutions (such as via banking or fiscal 
union) draw the ire of the populist right.  
On the other side, the inability of mainstream governments to 
implement the governance and economic reforms necessary to 
render the Euro area more workable means that 
macroeconomic performance suffers and social uncertainties 
and disruption persist and intensify, fueling the rise of 
populism. A self-sustaining vicious cycle of ever-intensifying 
tension can emerge. Breaking this cycle becomes central to the 
economic, financial, and ultimately political stability of Europe. 
Facing the fork in the road—eventually  
It is not as if the European authorities do not know what to do. 
The economic and institutional requirements that were lacking 
from the Maastricht framework—stronger mechanisms for risk-
sharing across Euro area countries—are well-understood. What 
has been lacking is the political will to implement them. 
A Euro-optimist would say that, in the present improving 
macroeconomic environment, the populists’ electoral strength 
will act as a galvanizing force for reform. The mainstream 
governments we see as likely to emerge from forthcoming 
elections will exploit the space afforded them by European 
electoral systems to make necessary changes that break the 
vicious downward spiral. We have long awaited such action. 
A Euro-pessimist would argue that mainstream politicians have 
repeatedly failed to make use of the time provided to them to 
take difficult but necessary measures, preferring instead to 
perpetuate a status quo that is unsustainable over the longer 
run. It is always easier to let one’s successors do the heavy 
lifting down the road, especially if the ECB’s largesse and the 
political space created by electoral systems make the current 
situation tolerable. In this scenario, conditions slowly 
deteriorate, populism strengthens, and the underlying instability 
eventually becomes manifest. 
Only time will tell which of these two interpretations is correct. 
But either way—and in contrast to the focus of many market 
participants on political developments in the coming weeks—
the future of the Euro area is likely to be determined over a 
period of years rather than months. 
Huw Pill, Chief European Economist 
Email: huw.pill@gs.com  Goldman Sachs International 
Tel:  +44-20-7774-8736 
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Pascal Lamy is President Emeritus of the Jacques Delors Institute and former Director General of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Between 1985 and 1994, he was Chief of Staff to the 
President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and his “sherpa” at the G7. In this 
capacity, Lamy contributed to projects that laid the foundation for the European Economic and 
Monetary Union. He subsequently served as CEO of Credit Lyonnais until 1999, before returning 
to Brussels as European Trade Commissioner until 2004. His two terms at the WTO lasted from 
2005 to 2013. Below, he argues that today’s political zeitgeist threatens European integration, and 
that reinvigorating the European project requires Europe to become less “frigid”. 
The views stated herein are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect those of Goldman Sachs.
Allison Nathan: What do you make 
of the rise of populist parties in 
Europe on both the right and the 
left of the political spectrum?  
Pascal Lamy: This is not just 
happening in Europe. We see it in 
other parts of the world, for example 
with Donald Trump in the US, Rodrigo 
Duterte in the Philippines, Narendra 
Modi in India, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. As far as 
Europe is concerned, I see two main reasons for this 
phenomenon. The first is economic hardship and perception of 
rising inequality. The second is a cultural backlash driven by the 
feeling that migration is excessive and unharnessed. The 
question is, what are the proportions of these two? I’d probably 
say half and half. 
Allison Nathan: How does protectionism fit into the 
current political zeitgeist? Do you foresee a rollback in 
trade, whether in Europe or globally, as a result?  
Pascal Lamy: There is a growing discourse about 
protectionism and mercantilism, including the notion that 
imports are bad and exports are good, and that running a trade 
deficit means exporting jobs. These are medieval ways of 
thinking, in my view. Not everyone has embraced them; UK 
Prime Minister Theresa May intends to address Brexit with a 
“global Britain” open to international trade—far from the anti-
globalization aspect of what excited the Brexit vote. But the 
risk of protectionism is there. I think it is larger in the US than in 
Europe, because the US social safety net is thinner. But I am 
still betting on Trump being softer on trade than some of his 
rhetoric has suggested. 
In general, I do not foresee a meaningful rollback in trade 
because the world economy is now so tight-knit and global 
supply chains are so complex. The costs of protectionism 
would be extremely high, and would accrue quickly. The 
“safety ropes to reality,” so to speak, are much shorter today 
than they were 10 or 20 years ago. In other words, it would not 
be as difficult to steer support back towards free trade today.  
Allison Nathan: Much of the political discourse fueling anti-
establishment parties in Europe seems to be anti-migrant 
rather than anti-trade. Would you agree? 
Pascal Lamy: It’s difficult to distinguish between anti-migrant 
and anti-trade. Both are ways of scapegoating foreigners and 
attributing one’s problems and failures to those who are “like 
them” and not “like us.” This undercurrent of the political 
discourse is often more about perception than reality. In 
France, for example, despite the widespread perception that 
the inflow of migrants has been very large, the number of 
migrants is in fact relatively small, certainly when compared to 
a country like Germany.  
Allison Nathan: What do you think is driving the rise of 
Euroskeptic parties and politicians? 
Pascal Lamy: These politicians are largely following the pulse 
of domestic sentiment. The fact is that the public is less 
enthusiastic about Europe than it once was. It is therefore no 
surprise that we don’t have many strongly pro-European 
national leaders like we had in the 1980s and ‘90s with 
François Mitterrand of France, Helmut Kohl of Germany, Felipe 
González of Spain, or Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands. Take 
present-day Netherlands as an example: The prime minister, 
who is considered pro-European in the present Dutch context, 
is probably three times less pro-European than his predecessor 
was twenty years ago. 
Allison Nathan: What, in your view, is at the root of 
dwindling support for European integration? 
Pascal Lamy: European integration has not produced the sort 
of output, say prosperity or security, that people expect for the 
price of surrendering some control at the national level. The 
European system therefore suffers from a legitimacy problem, 
made worse by the distances between the national capitals and 
Brussels, and the misguided sense that officials in Brussels are 
unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats. Of course, that is just 
wrong. There are democratic processes and institutions in 
place at the European level precisely for the sake of 
establishing legitimacy. The European Parliament is elected; it 
has the power to sack the European Commission, which it has; 
and there are other checks and balances like the European 
Court of Justice. But the proof that Europe is better as one 
than as separate nations is just not there in many respects. We 
will be able to test this belief for the first time with Brexit. 
Allison Nathan: You spent a great deal of time at the 
European Commission. To what extent is Brussels 
responsible for the Euroskeptic backlash?  
Pascal Lamy: Brussels shares in the responsibility, but only in 
small part. Most of the responsibility rests with the member 
states, given the message they have perpetuated that all good 
things come from the nation and all bad things come from 
Brussels, as if decisions in Brussels were not taken by national 
Interview with Pascal Lamy 
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leaders. That’s an old game, and one that is played in many 
federal systems, including in the US, Canada, or Australia. 
The share of responsibility that falls on Brussels largely owes to 
the willingness of the European Commission under José 
Manuel Barroso to effectively accept this division of roles, with 
Brussels being the “bad guy” on austerity, forcing fiscal 
discipline on national governments. This reinforced the notion 
that punishment comes from Brussels, and was a huge 
mistake in my view. The proof is in the numbers: The 
Eurobarometer—a methodical and reliable measure of public 
sentiment in Europe—shows that with the exception of the UK, 
the share of people who think belonging to the EU is a good 
thing remains around 60% across Europe. But the share of 
people who trust European institutions to fix their problems has 
shrunk over the last ten years, and is now only around 35%. 
Allison Nathan: To what extent was such a Euroskeptic 
backlash predestined by the structure of the Euro area? 
Pascal Lamy: There are indeed intrinsic fragilities in the way 
the Euro area was built. These vulnerabilities were well-
identified at the time. As one of the authors of the system, I  
know too well the difference between what we proposed in 
1988 with our report on economic and monetary union and 
what was ultimately accepted by national leaders and 
diplomats in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, as nations resisted 
economic union. Jacques Delors himself said at the time that 
the economic and monetary union was “very monetary and not 
very economic.” He used the image of a person with one 
strong leg—the monetary one—and one weak leg—the 
economic one. If you have a strong leg and a weak leg, you can 
walk—albeit not very well—but you can’t run, which is what 
was required to recover from the 2008/09 financial crisis. The 
crisis exposed this discrepancy between the strong monetary 
union incarnated in the single currency and interest rate policy, 
and the relatively decentralized macroeconomic policy and 
coordination, which explains why Europe was not able to 
respond as rapidly and as effectively as the US to the crisis. 
Allison Nathan: Given all of this, how concerned are you 
that Brexit and Donald Trump are precursors for 
unexpected election outcomes in Europe? 
Pascal Lamy: There are obvious similarities, so I do see some 
risk of unexpected political outcomes in Europe. But I don’t 
think the risk will materialize because the European continent 
has larger social safety nets that help mitigate people’s sense 
of suffering from inequality, immigration, or lack of healthcare 
or education. Europe has generally not experienced the 
substantial reduction in safety nets that came with Thatcherism 
and Reaganism. But, again, the sense of suffering or frustration 
or disempowerment is still there, and so is the the risk of 
political surprises.  
Allison Nathan: If Marine Le Pen is elected, would that be 
the beginning of the end for the European project and the 
euro? 
Pascal Lamy:  Probably. It would be far more significant than 
Brexit because the UK has always been a very specific case. 
The European continent has a different mindset; polls suggest 
that pro-European sentiment on the continent actually 
increased by 5% in the months following the UK referendum. 
But if Le Pen were elected President of France and had the 
legitimacy and capacity to deliver on her campaign promises, 
this would be very bad news for Europe.  
Of course, whether or not she could secure this legitimacy is 
an open question. Contrary to what many people believe, 
France has a parliamentary, not a presidential, system of 
government. The president is directly elected and has more 
executive authority than heads of state in other parliamentary 
systems, such as the German president, but he or she still 
requires a parliamentary majority to implement policy. Many 
observers do not grasp this. They’re focused on the train 
coming at them—the presidential election—while ignoring the 
train right behind it—the legislative elections in June. Le Pen 
would need the support of parliament, for example, to pursue 
her plan to leave the euro. This may be a tall order, especially 
since current measures of public opinion suggest the majority 
of the French population supports the euro. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that the election of Le Pen would be 
interpreted as the third act of a Greek tragedy, which started 
with Brexit, and was then followed by Trump.  
Allison Nathan: Would it be possible to maintain the Euro 
area with a core of committed countries pursuing further 
integration and a set of surrounding countries that 
maintain more of their independence? 
Pascal Lamy: This is an intellectual question that has long been 
debated. The idea of a “multi-speed” Europe or “concentric 
circles” has come to fruition in some respects through the 
Schengen Area and the Euro area, which do not include all EU 
members. Beyond that, if the UK exits the EU, the chances for 
a multi-speed Europe are smaller because the UK was always 
the most likely candidate for the second speed. If the UK can’t 
achieve this, we’ll have doubts that others can. In short, the 
ability of a few countries to move forward with faster, deeper 
integration has not really materialized to date.  
Allison Nathan: How concerned are you about the 
European project today compared with past challenges? Is 
it possible to reinvigorate it at this point? 
Pascal Lamy: I think this is the biggest crisis we’ve seen yet—
and I say that as we approach the 60th anniversary of the 
Treaty of Rome this month. But in my view, it’s not an 
existential crisis; assuming Le Pen and similar forces stay at 
bay, the European project will continue to move forward. That 
said, it’s still a crisis that has slowed European integration and 
has therefore left Europe weaker compared to what it could or 
should have been relative to the rest of the world. And the 
longer we remain in slow motion, the more growth and welfare 
opportunities that will be missed.  
The key to reinvigorating the vision of an integrated Europe is 
to focus on the symbolic aspects of integration, which have not 
received enough consideration. We have to introduce more 
emotions and narratives. As the famous Israeli diplomat Élie 
Barnavi once said, we have to make Europe less “frigid.” That 
thawing needs to come first and foremost from the people. But 
all aspects of civil society including intellectuals, social 
movements, political parties, national leaders and even 
Brussels can play a role in reviving the vision of a greater 
Europe.
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Nonna Mayer is Research Director Emerita of the French National Center for Scientific Research 
at Sciences Po’s Center for European Studies. Her work focuses on political behaviors, right-wing 
extremism, and attitudes on race, immigration, and inequality. She is the author of several books 
on French politics and the sociology of voter behavior, and has published extensively on the Front 
National. From 2005 to 2016, she chaired the French Political Science Association. Below, she 
discusses Marine Le Pen’s mobilization of the right wing in France—a dynamic that is 
unprecedented but nevertheless unlikely to lead Le Pen to victory in the upcoming election. 
The views stated herein are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect those of Goldman Sachs.
Allison Nathan: How significant is 
the rising support for Marine Le Pen 
and her party, the National Front 
(FN), in a historical context? 
Nonna Mayer: Incredibly significant. 
No party has ever successfully united 
the French far-right in its long history, 
which dates back to the French 
revolution of 1789. Marine Le Pen’s 
father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, tried to in 
1972 when co-founding  the FN. But it was only in 1984, when 
it drew nearly 11% of the vote in European Parliament 
elections, that its success story began. Everyone said at the 
time that this support wouldn’t last. They were wrong.  
When Marine Le Pen became chair of the FN in 2011, she 
launched an unprecedented electoral dynamic for the party. In 
the 2007 presidential election, her father hardly drew 10.5% of 
the valid votes; in 2012, Marine Le Pen received nearly 18%. 
The FN’ share of the vote has since progressively increased to 
almost 28% in the last regional elections in December 2015. 
Today, voting intentions for the upcoming presidential election 
suggest Marine Le Pen will take 25-27% of the vote—far above 
the levels her father ever reached. 
Allison Nathan: Is support for Le Pen about economic 
disenfranchisement? About culture? About security?  
Nonna Mayer: The issue galvanizing support for FN has not 
changed much over time, and it comes down to one word:  
immigration. Many people in France feel that there are too 
many immigrants, but an exceptionally large share—90-98%—
of FN voters feel this way. Anti-immigrant sentiment is 
basically a necessary condition to vote for the party.  
In France  the word “immigrants” refers first of all to 
maghrébins from North Africa, evoking painful memories of our 
colonial history and the Algerian War of Independence. And it 
evokes Islam because most maghrébins are Muslims. Marine 
Le Pen just needs to say the word “immigrant” to play to her 
constituency’s worries. For FN voters, immigration is a package 
deal, capturing all of their concerns: In their minds, immigrants 
are the main threat to France’s national identity and culture; the 
key security concern because they are the main source of 
terrorism; the primary economic concern because they take 
away jobs and take advantage of social benefits.   
Allison Nathan: How has anti-immigration translated into 
the FN’s platform, and how has the platform evolved? 
Nonna Mayer: “National preference” or the more recently 
adopted “national priority” has always comprised the essence 
of the party platform. The idea is basically “French first”: Jobs, 
social benefits, housing programs, etc. must be kept for the 
French. Beyond this basic principle, the platform has evolved. 
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s enemy was primarily communism; Marine 
Le Pen’s enemy is Islamic fundamentalism. She is more 
socially liberal than her father on issues such as sexual 
orientation and women’s rights. And economically, she is more 
interventionist, stridently calling for the state to do more. She 
and the party are also more focused on the European issue. In 
2002, her father advocated for EU exit and rejection of the 
euro. But at the time, the majority of his voters didn’t share this 
view. They do today and restoration of French sovereignty vis-
à-vis the EU is a centerpiece of Marine Le Pen’s platform, 
despite less emphasis on it in her latest official policy 
program—probably to appease elderly voters afraid of 
abandoning the euro.  
Allison Nathan: If Marine Le Pen continues to soften her 
Euroskeptic message to win votes, would this softening 
stick should she win the election, considering that the 
broader electorate does not seem to support Frexit?  
Nonna Mayer: No, I think she would move more aggressively 
toward Frexit eventually. In an interview before presenting her 
official program she said clearly that if she were elected her 
first move would be to pursue constitutional reforms and to 
negotiate with Brussels to restore the sovereignty of the 
French nation on all levels; if those negotiations failed, she 
would pursue a referendum on Frexit. She hasn’t abandoned 
this idea, and she saw Brexit as proof that Frexit was possible.  
There are some cleavages within the party; her niece, Marion 
Maréchal Le Pen, thinks she is turning too radical. But 77% of 
Marine Le Pen’s supporters think the bad outweighs the good 
on EU membership. They see the EU as an open door to 
immigration that they want closed. So I think her slight 
retrenchment from Euroskepticism is purely cosmetic.  
Allison Nathan: How would you characterize FN voters?  
Nonna Mayer: Contrary to what one often hears, there has 
never been a “typical” FN voter. Since the beginning, the party 
has drawn votes from all corners of the population, albeit from 
some more than others. Jean-Marie Le Pen gradually expanded 
his strongholds from small shopkeepers and artisans  to blue-
collar workers and eventually to farmers. But the key factor is 
education. FN voters triple as one moves from those with a 
university degree to those who did not finish high school. 
Interview with Nonna Mayer 
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Marine Le Pen has diversified the voter base even further, 
especially in terms of women. Historically, Jean-Marie Le Pen 
attracted 5-7pp more men than women voters. In 2012, with 
Marine Le Pen, this so-called “radical-right gender gap” 
disappeared. This is important because women represent 53% 
of the registered French electorate. The real question is 
whether she will manage to repeat this in the upcoming 
election. In all the midterm elections since 2012, European, 
local and regional, the gender gap reappeared; turnout among 
women slipped relative to men. Since presidential elections are 
so crucial, she hopes that she will be able to draw back female 
voters, which she has made concerted efforts to do by 
producing special leaflets and slogans targeting women. 
Allison Nathan: Would mobilizing women be sufficient for 
her to win the election? What would it take for her to win? 
Nonna Mayer: Even if women vote for her as often as men do, 
it will be difficult for her to win the second round. Le Pen hasn’t 
gained enough credibility; only one-fourth of the electorate 
thinks she has the capacity to be the president of the Republic. 
And perhaps even more importantly, the FN still has a negative 
image; a recent poll showed that 58% of people see the party 
as a danger to democracy, and two out of three say Marine Le 
Pen actually frightens them. No other party wants to ally with 
the FN, which is critical in two-round elections and explains 
why the FN has a history of performing strongly in the first-
round but losing the second round.   
Marine Le Pen’s chances of winning hinge on her ability to 
mobilize voters versus her opponents’ ability to do so. In this 
regard, developments that could favor her include a terrorist 
attack, given her strong stance on law and order, or a new 
scandal that would erode support for her opponents. Should 
Marine Le Pen face Emmanuel Macron in the second round, 
there is also the potential for left-wing voters to abstain if they 
decide that he is not sufficiently leftist. In short, it is not 
impossible for her to win, but I believe it is very unlikely. And if 
Fillon restores his image, she might even  be excluded from 
the second round. But uncertainty remains high. Only 60% of 
voters have decided who they will vote for in the first round—a 
record low this close to the election.  
Allison Nathan: Recent experience in the UK and US have 
cast serious doubt on opinion polls. Could the polls, which 
all show Le Pen losing in the 2nd round, be wrong again? 
Nonna Mayer: I’m very cautious about opinion polls, especially 
when so many voters remain undecided. But I’ve been 
studying the FN since 1984, and despite its spectacular 
electoral gains, I still see some limitations to its popularity, not 
only in polls but in face-to-face interviews. Marine Le Pen is still 
seen as the daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, despite excluding 
him from the party. And Jean-Marie Le Pen remains a highly 
controversial figure, associated with anti-semitism among other 
things. I just don’t see her overcoming that legacy at this point.  
Allison Nathan: Assuming Marine Le Pen loses this 
election, will she continue to gain momentum?  
Nonna Mayer: The story doesn’t end with round two. The 
parliamentary elections in mid-June are perhaps even more 
important. Currently, the FN has just two deputies in the 
National Assembly and two senators; it desperately needs 
more elected representatives. The party is very focused on the 
goal of securing at least 15 deputies in the National Assembly, 
the threshold to form a political group that would provide the 
party more visibility, money and weight. Based on the regional 
elections, that goal seems to be within reach.  
But if the FN does not make meaningful gains, resentment 
within the party would likely set in, exacerbating current 
divisions. As I mentioned, Marion Maréchal Le Pen takes a 
more traditional, conservative line than her aunt and there is 
also some discontent with Florian Philippot—the number two in 
the party—who some see as an outsider who does not 
embody the FN’s core beliefs. So the failure to make gains in 
June could be a blow to Marine Le Pen’s power in the party 
and its effectiveness overall should a leadership battle ensue. 
Allison Nathan: If Marine Le Pen unexpectedly wins the 
election, would that necessarily be a good thing for FN? 
Nonna Mayer: It could backfire because her “national priority” 
platform goes against the equality of French citizens enshrined 
in the French constitution. Even if the FN manages to make 
substantial gains in parliament, she is very unlikely to have 
sufficient support to implement the constitutional reforms that 
would be required. And she would likely end up in a 
government of “cohabitation”, with a parliament that does not 
support her program. This suggests her first months in office 
would probably be an ordeal rather than a honeymoon.  
Allison Nathan: Observers often like to compare leaders 
like Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump. What’s your take?   
Nonna Mayer: The common thread between all of these 
leaders and movements is their ability to present themselves 
as defenders against globalization, which they frame 
ideologically as a triple economic, cultural, and political threat. 
In that regard, Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump are like-
minded; they are both nationalist, protectionist, anti-immigrant, 
anti-Islam, and anti-elite. And they both have a way of 
simplifying things into black and white. That said, some of their 
ideas differ; Marine Le Pen is far more interventionist on the 
economy, for example. But their biggest differences relate to 
their political legitimacy. Although Donald Trump says he is an 
outsider, he is not. He was the Republican candidate even if 
some Republicans were behind him more than others. And 
today, his party has the majority in Congress. You simply can’t 
compare his situation to that of Marine Le Pen, who is still 
struggling to overcome the legacy of her father and whose 
party is still not seen as capable to govern.  
Allison Nathan: Given that Marine Le Pen would have 
difficulty governing as you say, would her unexpected 
election be as traumatic for the EU as many are claiming? 
Nonna Mayer: Yes, symbolically it would likely be the start of 
the un-knitting of the Euro area. It would probably end the 
German-French alliance, would open the door to other nations 
leaving, and would give legitimacy to other far-right political 
movements. And economically it would be a mess, likely 
leading to a sharp sell-off in stock markets and capital flight. 
Even if there is broad recognition that she won’t be able to 
achieve her nativist and anti-Europe agenda, just the notion of 
somebody like her having enough popular support to be elected 
in a country like France would be truly a shock. 
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Pierre Vernet finds that Marine Le Pen’s pull is 
strongest in areas that are (1) farther from 
major cities, and have (2) smaller economies 
and (3) high socio-cultural heterogeneity 
France is no exception to the ongoing political realignments 
along a mainstream/populist spectrum seen in many advanced 
economies. Over the past two decades, two main drivers—
globalization and technological change—have exacerbated a 
long-standing political fissure between France’s biggest cities, 
well plugged into the global economy and benefiting from the 
most job creation (e.g., Paris, Lyon, Toulouse), and urban or 
rural peripheries hit by deindustrialization and/or faced with 
persistent socio-cultural or demographic concerns.  
This latter set of voters is likely to see the upcoming 
presidential election as the most effective way to “reset” 
French politics. While checks and balances exist in the French 
system, they are lower than in many other parliamentary 
democracies, affording the president perhaps greater power to 
act on his/her platform. This setup likely accounts for the 
remarkably high voter turnout witnessed in French presidential 
elections over the past 50 years, at around 80%. 
Presidential elections: A chance to reset French politics? 
Voter turnout in French elections under the Fifth Republic (1958-
2015) 
 
*First and second rounds. Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur (France). 
So far, the populist Front National (FN) candidate Marine Le 
Pen has been the most successful at connecting with the 
growing pool of French voters seeking to change the status 
quo. Where exactly is she drawing her support? Matching 
election results for most of France’s 30,000 municipalities with 
our unique set of data on socio-demographic variables and 
income levels—using satellite-recorded nighttime light intensity 
as a proxy for economic activity—helps answer this question.  
Mapping the populist pull 
Specifically, Le Pen’s pull appears strongest in areas that are (1) 
farther from major cities, and have (2) smaller economies and 
(3) high socio-cultural heterogeneity. This suggests that the 
geographic concentration of economic activity (and, for large 
open cities, globalization) has deep-seated links to populism.  
For example, the geographic mismatch in France’s distribution 
of job creation/destruction in recent years has likely increased 
concerns about globalization in urban and rural peripheries. 
Moreover, the process of gentrification of large cities (via 
higher housing prices) has likely discouraged low-earning 
households on the periphery from relocating towards the more 
dynamic job-creating urban centers. The outcome is a lifestyle 
that feels at odds with the promises of globalization. 
France’s jobs mismatch 
Net job creation/destruction by French municipality, 1999-2013 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, INSEE.  
The story doesn’t end here 
Turning to the upcoming election, our analysis suggests Le Pen 
could win close to 30% in the first round, 5pp above her 
showing in recent polls. That said, we continue to think that 
she is unlikely to win the run-off in May. A key reason for this is 
the high degree of state intervention within the French 
economy, which has insulated large segments of the electorate 
from the impacts of globalization. This safety net should 
ultimately cap Le Pen's electoral base.  
However, the story doesn’t end there. The socioeconomic and 
cultural drivers of populism and Euroskepticism are unlikely to 
reverse anytime soon; as such, the ongoing realignment of 
French politics into a competition between urban, socially 
liberal, and pro-European elites versus rural or peri-urban 
conservative populists will likely remain incomplete in this 
election cycle. Ironically, the set of structural reforms promised 
by Le Pen’s mainstream opponents (Emmanuel Macron and 
François Fillon) may weaken the social safety net and further 
concentrate economic activity in urban areas, further fueling 
populism over the medium term. On that basis, we expect the 
populist pull in France to continue well beyond this election.      
Pierre Vernet, European Economist 
Email: pierre.vernet@gs.com  Goldman Sachs International 
Tel:  +44-20-7552-0428 
For more, see European Economics Analyst: Populist pull likely to 
persist beyond French elections (10 March, 2017). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
58 63 68 73 78 83 88 93 98 03 08 13 18
Presidential*
Legislative*
Regional*
Departmental*
Municipal*
European
Trend Presidential elections
Trend non-Presidential elections
25-30% 
wedge
Marseille
Toulouse
Bordeaux
Nantes
Lille
Lyon
Paris
Net job creation
(size: number of jobs)
Net job destruction
(size: number of jobs)
The populist pull in France 
El 
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 13 
Top of Mind Issue 55 
Right w ing in the north and south backs FN 
Absolute difference in the number of votes for the FN between the second round of the 2015 regional election and the 2012 presidential 
election; size of bubble indicates number of FN ballots 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Ministère de l’Intérieur (France). 
 
Breaking down the FN’s pull 
Share of the local vote for Marine Le Pen in the 2012 presidential election (y axis) along the Paris-Lyon corridor, sorted by driving time to 
either city (x axis); economic activity measured by satellite-recorded light intensity (bubble size); and cultural heterogeneity (coloring) 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Ministère de l’Intérieur (France), Google Maps, NASA Earth Observatory/NOAA NGDC, OpenStreetMap.  
*Cultural heterogeneity refers to INSEE’s 2013 Census survey count of immigrants at the municipality level. Methodology available at the link above. 
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Q: If Marine Le Pen unexpectedly won the French election, how much power would she have to implement policy? 
A: This is difficult to predict. A Le Pen victory would have profound effects, potentially upending the Fifth Republic’s 
institutional and political dynamics. In addition, much would depend on perceptions of Le Pen’s mandate; for example, if her 
win owes largely to a low participation rate rather than an increase in electoral support, her legitimacy could be weakened.  
In theory, the French president is very powerful, but in practice this power depends on the strength of the president’s party in 
the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament. The lower house’s support is necessary to pass legislation, but it is also 
important for the prime minister, who signs off on most orders from the president. While the president selects the prime 
minister—in principle, anyone can be nominated—the lower house can force the prime minister and his/her cabinet to resign. 
Currently, the Front National (FN) has 2/577 seats in the lower house and 2/348 in the Senate, the less powerful upper house.  
Q: Aren’t there legislative elections coming up? Could the FN win more seats? 
A: Elections to the lower house will take place in two rounds on June 11 and 18. However, the FN is very unlikely to gain 
enough seats for a majority, and its extreme positions make it difficult to form a coalition with other parties.1 The FN has strong 
support in France’s south and northeast, but the two-round election system tends to restrain extreme political parties/platforms 
by design; voters must choose among a smaller set of options in the second round, and parties are free to form alliances to 
stave off competition. Indeed, the FN did not take control of a single regional government in 2015 elections despite winning the 
largest share of the vote—with a significant lead—in half of the regions during the first round. The party’s strong performance 
both mobilized voters (leading to increased participation in the second round) and encouraged more mainstream parties to form 
alliances to avoid splitting the vote. Not surprisingly, Marine Le Pen has advocated for switching to a one-round voting system.  
Q: What would happen if Le Pen were elected president but didn’t have a majority of support in the lower house?  
A: In principle, there is a historical precedent for “cohabitation” in France, whereby a president and prime minister from 
different parties share power. This arrangement curtails presidential authority over domestic issues, limiting it to foreign affairs 
and defense. Cohabitation has happened three times before (1986-1988, 1993-1995, and 1997-2002), with varying degrees of 
cooperation and competition. However, as mentioned above, the potential disruptive effects of a Le Pen win could render 
these examples irrelevant; in other words, past periods of cohabitation would hardly be reliable models for what to expect.   
Q: Would Le Pen be able to call a referendum on France’s membership in the EU? 
A: Le Pen has proposed to hold six months of negotiations with the EU in the pursuit of restoring some of France’s national 
sovereignty over economic, fiscal, monetary, and immigration policy. If the negotiations are considered unsatisfactory, she 
intends to organize a referendum on France’s EU membership.  
The French Constitution indeed allows for such a referendum under Article 11 of the chapter dealing with the powers of the 
president. A referendum in France is powerful: If the measures proposed under the referendum are accepted by the French 
people, even if only by a small margin, the president must sign them into law within 15 days of the referendum results without 
any debate and possible recourse from parliament.  
Although the president has full discretion to accept or reject a proposal to hold a referendum, she/he cannot initiate such a 
proposal; to balance the powers between the executive and legislative powers, Article 11 foresees only two specific cases in 
which such a referendum could be organized:  
1. On a proposal of the government while parliament is in session, or on a joint proposal from both houses of parliament. 
2. Or, per a constitutional revision made in 2008, on the initiative of at least one-fifth of the members of parliament 
(namely 185 out of 925 members) and of at least 10% of registered voters (4.6 million people).  
As per above, it is unlikely that Le Pen would have sufficient support in parliament to use either of these procedures. (See also 
European Economics Daily: French Elections, 6 February 2017.) 
Q. What would happen if she attempted to call a referendum anyway? 
A: First, it is not certain that French citizens would support such a referendum given their attachment to the euro.2 Second, any 
deviation from these constitutional provisions (e.g., if the referendum proposal came from Le Pen or from a government 
without parliamentary legitimacy) would create an institutional impasse, as the Constitutional Council and the Council of State 
would question the referendum’s legality. But these legal considerations may be of secondary importance as, again, the 
election of Le Pen would likely disrupt existing institutional dynamics, creating a highly uncertain environment. In particular, it 
would endanger the Franco-German axis, a cornerstone of the European project and the euro (see pg. 18). 
Alain Durré and Marina Grushin 
                                                             
1 Based on voting patterns in 2015 regional elections, a June 2016 study conducted by OpinionWay estimated that the FN could take 58-64 seats in the National 
Assembly, far short of the 289 needed for a majority. See Législatives 2017: vers une recomposition inédite?, June 2016. 
2 In a recent survey conducted by Elabe, 72% of surveyed French citizens are opposed to an exit of the Euro (out of which 44% are strongly opposed, especially among 
retired people). 
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How are European political risks affecting your asset class?  
How might the outcome of the French presidential election impact your asset class? 
DM FX 
 
Silvia Ardagna 
• Our baseline of a “muddling through” in the Euro area supports a decline in EUR/USD to parity over the 
next 12 months, mainly due to an unchanged monetary policy stance by the ECB and more Fed 
tightening than the market is pricing. However, the French election creates fat tails around this outlook.  
• If Marine Le Pen wins the election (not our base case), sizeable EUR redenomination risk could build, 
likely moving EUR/USD below parity much faster than our forecast implies. On the other hand, 
EUR/USD could move above the 1.10 range if Emmanuel Macron wins and discussions around ceding 
some fiscal sovereignty to Brussels gain traction while Euro area growth remains well above trend. 
DM Rates 
 
Francesco 
Garzarelli 
 
• Our analysis suggests that France displaced Italy this year as the dominant force pulling EMU yields 
higher, reflecting a build-up of risk premium ahead of the French elections. We estimate that close to 
half of the 65bp spread of 10-year French OAT yields over German Bunds represents an election risk 
premium. However, there is little evidence of a rise in systemic EMU risk to the extent seen in 2012.  
• The elevated risk premium on OATs is likely to persist—potentially widening to as much as 80-100bp—
at least up to the first round of voting on April 23. Thereafter, the direction of the market will depend on 
the gap between the share of vote going to the FN and the polls; any shift in Le Pen's platform in order 
to attract voters; and which candidate she faces in the run-off. As market tensions rise, we would 
expect the ECB to adjust its bond purchases in favor of non-core markets (as in the wake of Brexit), but 
not to be able to contain selling pressures on prices fully. 
• Should Le Pen lose to a moderate, reformist, and pro-European candidate, we would expect the 10-year 
OAT-Bund spread to head back to 40-50bp, driven in large part by a rise in Bund yields. If Le Pen were 
to win, the dislocations in EMU bond markets could be severe, at least initially (see pg. 17).  
EM 
 
Caesar Maasry 
 
Kamakshya 
Trivedi 
 
• With EM assets generally towards the high-beta end of the risky asset spectrum, the overall drawdown 
risk associated with European political issues remains a key headwind for EM during 2017. However, 
we note that EM valuations (in equity, FX, and credit) appear less-stretched than their DM counterparts. 
• Political risks likely manifest most clearly in peripheral spreads, which in turn can pressure EM rates 
higher. Again, compared with the rate shock associated with the “taper tantrum,” EMs have largely 
rebalanced (mainly from a current account perspective) and EM assets are less sensitive to DM shocks. 
• Fundamentally, CE-3 is the most exposed to European political risks due to strong trade linkages and 
institutional ties, and regional economies such as Turkey and Russia are closely linked as well. An 
escalation of political risks—such as an unexpected win by Marine Le Pen—would likely drive $/CE-3 
higher, though it is less clear that Euro/CE-3 would necessarily move higher. With EM equities and 
credits coming off a very strong performance since late 2016 (and CE-3 equities in particular), we would 
be more cautious on these assets should European risks escalate.  
Credit 
 
Lotfi Karoui 
 
Bridget Bartlett 
 
• Upcoming elections have injected meaningful uncertainty into the EUR credit markets, driving EUR IG 
spreads wider and increasing their underperformance vs. their US counterparts. EUR 5-year IG spreads 
currently trade 24bp wider than their US IG counterparts, vs. an 11bp average over the past 12 months.  
• Uncertainty will likely continue to weigh on risk appetite as voters head to the polls in the coming 
months. That said, in the absence of a tail-risk election outcome, we think the combined effect of 
improving macro fundamentals, the ECB’s support, low new issue volumes, and strong “incompressible 
demand” from future coupon and principal payments will likely put a ceiling on any spread widening. 
Equity 
 
Peter 
Oppenheimer 
 
Sharon Bell 
 
Christian 
Mueller-
Glissmann 
 
• Political risk appears to be holding back European equities. Assuming market-friendly outcomes in the 
French and Dutch elections, we would expect European equities to enjoy a bounce and a period of 
outperformance vs. the US (at least in local currency terms), supported by better global growth, positive 
earnings revisions, and attractive valuations (for more, see pg. 16).  
• In contrast, if Marine Le Pen were to win the French election, the result would likely be a steep rise in 
the Equity Risk Premium and a large sell-off in European risk assets. We would expect to see the 
greatest impact on assets directly threatened by concerns about the existence of the euro. Bank-heavy 
indices (MIB, IBEX) would likely be hardest-hit given their exposure to redenomination risk, while 
defensive indices or indices outside the Euro area (DAX, SMI, FTSE 100) would do better in relative 
terms. That said, much would depend on Le Pen’s rhetoric and her ability to execute on policy priorities.  
Commodity  
 
Jeff Currie 
 
Max Layton 
 
• If Marine Le Pen loses the French election, we are relatively agnostic on the outlook for gold from here, 
with 3/6/12-month targets of $1200/$1200/$1250/oz. In contrast, a victory by Le Pen could result in an 
increase in financial market volatility, potential monetary easing by the ECB, and a strengthening of the 
USD. We believe gold prices would rise, given that any flight to safety and ECB easing would likely push 
down long-term US real rates, which in turn could offset the impact of the stronger dollar. A victory by 
Le Pen may also pose major downside risks to global equity markets and household wealth, not just in 
Europe but in other DMs, which would be bullish for gold demand as a hedge against wealth shocks. 
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Peter Oppenheimer expects a bounce in 
European equities if tail-risk outcomes do not 
materialize in upcoming elections 
There are several reasons to think that European equities have 
been held back by political concerns. Europe is no longer seen 
as much of an economic risk; after all, European growth has 
been above trend for some time. The composite PMI for 
February was well above expectations at 56, a 70-month high. 
And the bank sector, which has long been the source of risk 
and concern for investors in Europe, has performed better as 
fears about capital shortfalls have moderated. Nonetheless, the 
Stoxx 600 and Eurostoxx 50 are up about 3.3% so far this year, 
while the S&P 500 is up by over 5.5%.  
Much of this underperformance seems to relate to political 
concerns, which are even more visible in volatility markets; 
volatility term structure is currently showing a kink for April and 
May (around the French elections) for Eurostoxx 50 while 
remaining relatively flat for the S&P 500. And the ratio of 
VSTOXX vs. VIX April futures is already comparable to pre-
Brexit and Euro area crisis levels. If elections in the Netherlands 
and France do not result in tail risk outcomes, this should 
remove a major source of investor fears; we would therefore 
expect European equities to enjoy a bounce and a period of 
relative outperformance (at least in local currency terms). 
Reasons for equity election relief 
First, European equity markets are geared to global growth and 
typically outperform at times when global growth accelerates. 
We estimate that a 1% rise in global GDP weighted by the 
sales destinations of companies would boost European profits 
by 11%, all else equal. Europe is more operationally levered 
than the US or the UK; for each 1% rise in top-line growth we 
would expect a 1.8% rise in US earnings but a 2.9% rise in 
European earnings. But recent stronger global growth—let 
alone better European growth—has yet to translate into better 
European equity performance. 
Second, while less important than growth, weakening 
domestic currencies are a tailwind to Europe’s foreign-exposed 
companies. This is very obvious in the case of the FTSE 100 
(where 80% of the revenues are non-domestic), but true to 
some degree for the rest of Europe too. While a fall in political 
risk could push the euro higher temporarily, our currency 
strategists’ fundamental view is that the euro will weaken over 
time, as US policy rates are expected to rise more than the 
market is currently pricing over the next several months while 
Euro area rates remain unchanged on our forecasts until 2019.  
Third, for the first time since 2010 earnings revisions in Europe 
have turned positive. While this is largely a function of the 
commodity sectors (and to a lesser extent financials), it is 
nonetheless a big turnaround from recent years. Even the 
absence of downgrades should be welcome.  
Fourth, valuation in Europe is starting to look unusually cheap 
relative to the US. The 12-month forward PE of the Stoxx 600 
is 14.9x—more or less in line with recent years—compared to 
18.1x for the S&P 500, which has increased since the Fed rate 
hike in 2015. Note that the median stock in the S&P 500 now 
trades in the 99th percentile of historical ranges over 40 years. 
P/B for the S&P 500 is 3.1x (in the 83rd percentile), while for 
the Stoxx 600 it is 1.8x (in the 63rd percentile for its respective 
history).   
European valuations: relatively cheap 
NTM P/E ratio for the S&P 500 and Stoxx 600 
 
Source: Datastream, IBES, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.  
Fifth, European banks are performing better and have been less 
impacted by the recent political risk and rise in sovereign 
spreads; banks are the biggest sector in the Stoxx 600 (12.6%) 
and the Eurostoxx (14.6%) and make up an even larger share of 
the IBEX and MIB  (35% and 25% in Spain and Italy, 
respectively). Typically, when banks outperform in the 
European market, the European market outperforms the US.  
Lastly, political concerns have already pushed investors away 
from Europe; 2016 was a year of large selling of European 
equities by both European and US investors. All told, if political 
risk moderates in line with current polling, European equity 
fundamentals are likely to reassert themselves in a more 
positive way. That said, we caution that an unexpected win by 
Marine Le Pen in France would raise serious redenomination 
risks and, as a consequence, potential systemic risk. Thus, it 
would be dangerous to view the substantial rally in US equities 
post the unexpected election of Donald Trump as a precedent; 
in our view, a sharp and potentially prolonged sell-off in 
European equities would very likely ensue.    
Serious selling in 2016 
US-based flows in European mutual funds (including ETFs), $bn 
 
Source: AMG, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.  
Peter Oppenheimer, Chief Global Equity Strategist 
Email: peter.oppenheimer@gs.com  Goldman Sachs International 
Tel:  +44-20-7552-5782 
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Francesco Garzarelli finds little evidence (so 
far) of systemic risk based on market pricing 
ahead of the French presidential elections 
Twice bitten, thrice shy. After the surprise outcomes of the UK 
referendum and the US presidential election, investors are 
following opinion polls for the French presidential election with 
uneasiness given the popularity of Marine Le Pen, leader of the 
Euroskeptic and anti-immigration Front National (FN). Although 
the odds of Le Pen winning in the second round appear slim, 
the market impact that would follow her victory could be 
severe, at least initially. Even if Le Pen’s plan for “Frexit” faces 
institutional hurdles (see pg. 14), majority support for her 
“France First” policy agenda would be a blow to the monetary 
union at a time when deeper economic integration and risk-
sharing among EMU members are needed. Should Le Pen win 
against the odds, expectations of reintroduction of national 
currencies would rise, market dislocations could potentially 
emerge, primarily in EMU sovereign bonds, and bank and 
international spillovers would likely follow.  
Muted market response, so far  
Considering what’s at stake, the market response has so far 
been remarkably orderly and, overall, quite muted. As would be 
expected, French government bonds (OAT) are showing some 
signs of anxiety. Their return correlation to German Bund yields 
has declined to the low 70% range, compared to an average of 
around 90% since the start of the ECB's quantitative easing 
(QE). At the same time, our analysis isolating the “rate shocks” 
driving EMU bond markets suggests that France displaced Italy 
this year as the dominant force pulling EMU yields higher, 
reflecting a build-up of risk premium ahead of the elections. 
Little sign of “ flight to quality”  
Daily pairwise correlation with 10-year German Bund yields, % 
 
Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.  
Meanwhile, riskier Italy, Spain, and Portugal government bonds 
are trading at a higher positive correlation to Germany than the 
average of the past two years. And Spanish government bonds 
have continued to outperform, keeping the EMU rate complex 
in check. These price patterns have none of the hallmarks of 
past “flight-to-quality” episodes, suggesting that sovereign 
bond markets are far from pricing in a serious increase in EMU 
breakup risk. This is consistent with market pricing in FX: the 
euro has traded well over recent weeks. French risk is being 
priced mostly in the options market, with EUR/USD options 
discounting a 1.5% “gap risk” in the first round of the election. 
France in the driver’s seat 
Cumulative “ shocks”  originating in each sovereign bond market 
 
Based on Rigobon (2003). Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Research.   
Other than the relatively low probability assigned to Le Pen 
winning, this muted response probably reflects supportive 
underlying macro forces at play. The Euro area is currently 
enjoying strong economic performance, expanding at around 
twice its 1% trend rate. And expectations of fiscal easing by 
the new US administration have buoyed confidence in 
continued expansion of the business cycle. Against this 
backdrop, cyclical stocks and corporate bond returns remain 
attractive, and the yield curve is steepening, generating a better 
environment for bank lending. Again, there is no evidence of a 
rise in systemic risk to the extent seen in 2012.  
What’s ahead 
We estimate that close to half of the current 65bp spread 
between French and German 10-year bond yields represents an 
election risk premium. We expect the overall spread to remain 
elevated—possibly widening to as much as 80-100bp—at least 
up to the first round of the presidential elections. From there, 
the direction of the market will be dictated by the gap between 
the share of the vote going to the FN and the polls (which will 
likely influence the confidence level around voting intentions for 
the second round); any shift in Le Pen's stance in order to 
attract voters; and which candidate she faces in the May run-
off. Should market tensions rise, we would expect the ECB to 
moderate price action by shifting its QE bond purchases in 
favor of non-core markets under pressure, as was the case in 
the wake of Brexit. However, we do not think that ECB action 
would be able to fully contain selling pressures.  
In our central case of the election of a moderate, reformist, and 
pro-European candidate, we expect the 10-year OAT-Bund 
spread to head back to 40-50bp. A large chunk of the 
compression would come from a rise in Bund yields. Italian 
BTP spreads to Bunds, meanwhile, could come down from 
180bp to around 150-160bp. Lastly, Spanish Bonos should 
continue to perform well—though we would caution that 
investor positioning is already quite bullish, and they would 
underperform as core yields rise.  
Francesco Garzarelli 
Co-Head of Global Macro & Markets Research 
Email: francesco.garzarelli@gs.com  Goldman Sachs International 
Tel:  +44-20-7774-5078 
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Alain Durré writes that further progress on 
EMU integration hinges in large part on the 
September 2017 German elections  
The rise of Euroskeptic populism has touched Germany since 
2013 with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which 
emerged just four months ahead of the 2013 general elections 
with a program that focused on “leaving the Euro to save 
Europe.” The party narrowly missed garnering enough votes to 
pass the 5% threshold required to enter the German 
parliament, and its popularity stagnated following this setback. 
But support for AfD rose again after it took a more forceful anti-
immigration stance in the wake of Chancellor Merkel's 
controversial September 2015 decision to open the German 
border for refugees stranded in Hungary, which triggered a 
surge in immigration.  
Notwithstanding the recent boost in AfD support amid the 
refugee influx, the stated refusal of mainstream parties to 
cooperate with the AfD takes a coalition government that 
includes the party off the table. Thus, in contrast to concerns 
about the risk of more Euroskeptic governments in other 
countries (think France), the real question surrounding the 
September 24 German elections is how pro-European the next 
German government might be, and how much of an impulse 
that would give to the European project. Indeed, the only way 
to guarantee the longevity of the euro is to complete the 
institutional framework of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), likely starting with the completion of the banking union 
and the acceptance of the mutualization of some 
macroeconomic risks. Progress in these areas will no doubt 
hinge on the next German chancellor.  
Schulz more pro-European than Merkel 
Polls suggest that the most likely election outcome remains a 
repeat of the current Grand Coalition. The key question is under 
whose leadership. Chancellor Merkel and Martin Schulz, the 
Social Democrat (SPD) candidate, will compete on various 
dimensions in the election. But in the specific context of the 
EMU, Schulz could ultimately be more “market-friendly” from 
the point of view of Euro area stability. Indeed, with Merkel, 
there is no reason to expect a shift from the current 
stabilization policies in the Euro area. But under Schulz, the 
Grand Coalition would likely take a more pro-European tilt.  
Indeed, despite criticism in Germany against Chancellor Merkel 
for her “generosity” vis-à-vis Europe, SPD’s choice of Schulz 
signalled a willingness to embrace a more pro-European/ 
”federalist” stance. Case in point: On announcing his decision 
to withdraw his candidacy and presenting Schulz as the SPD 
candidate with "the best chance of winning the election," Vice-
Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel openly criticized Merkel, arguing that 
the policies under her leadership have contributed "decisively to 
the ever deeper crises in the European Union since 2008, to 
the isolation of the German government, seen as increasingly 
dominant, ruthlessly clinging to the austerity policy, and to the 
high level of unemployment outside Germany."  
Given this set-up, Schulz’s leadership could even some 
progress on EMU integration, perhaps in the area of the 
deposit insurance scheme and/or Eurobonds, which have 
essentially been non-starters to date. But any steps toward 
further integration would likely reassure the market about the 
future of the euro. So far, German voters seem to be on board, 
as Schulz’s designation as the SPD candidate coincided with 
increased support for the SPD in opinion polls at the expense 
of Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU).  
Such a vote could not be coming at a more important moment 
for European integration. The impatience of European voters 
who feel “left behind”—as illustrated by the growing success 
of Euroskeptic parties—reminds us that the development of a 
real and effective economic union within the EMU is more 
urgent than ever if the EMU is to succeed. Once again, this 
necessary new impulse to the EMU must come from the 
leaders of the Franco-German axis, the historical motor of 
European integration—raising the stakes for forthcoming 
elections in both countries.     
Alain Durré, Senior European Economist 
Email: alain.durre@gs.com  Goldman Sachs International 
Tel:  +33-1-4212-1127 
For more, see European Economics Daily: German elections: Polls point 
to market- and Euro-friendly outcomes (15 February, 2017).  
 
Germany’s vote of confidence 
Average German voting intentions based on five main opinion polls, % 
 
Source: Wahlumfragen.de, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 
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Globalization: where they stand 
Share that sees globalization as a threat, % (shown for each country 
overall and for supporters of parties in power vs. populist parties) 
 Did somebody say fragmentation? 
Largest party’s % of the vote in parliamentary elections (lhs) vs. number 
of parties that won seats in the same election (rhs), period average 
 
 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Eupinions: Fear Not Values (November 2016).  Covers current EU members that held elections during the 1951-1955 period. 
Source: Döring, Holger, and Manow, 2016, ParlGov; Goldman Sachs Research. 
   
Populists’ progress 
Select parties’ % of the vote in last election vs. previous election 
 Tracking the Le Pen trend 
France’s interest in “Marine Le Pen” based on Google searches 
 
 
 
Source: Government websites, various news sources.  Source: Google Trends. 
   
Uncertain times 
France news-based Economic Policy Uncertainty index 
 No stranger to surprises 
Opinion polling and results for 2002 French presidential election, % 
 
 
 
Source: www.policyuncertainty.com, Goldman Sachs Global Investment 
Research. 
 Source: Sofres / LCI / Politique Opinion / Le Nouvel Observateur. 
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Current Activity Indicator (CAI) 
Measures the growth signal in the major high-frequency activity indicators for the economy. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a 
useful but imperfect guide to current activity. In most countries, GDP is only available quarterly, is released with a substantial 
delay, and initial estimates are often heavily revised. GDP also ignores important measures of real activity, such as employment 
and the purchasing managers’ indexes (PMIs). All of these problems reduce the effectiveness of GDP for investment and policy 
decisions. Our CAIs are alternative summary measures of economic activity that attempt to overcome some of these drawbacks. 
We currently calculate CAIs for the following countries: USA, Euro area, UK, Norway, Sweden, China, Japan, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand.  
Financial Conditions Index (FCI) 
Financial conditions are important because shifts in monetary policy do not tell the whole story. Our FCIs attempt to measure the 
direct and indirect effects of monetary policy on economic activity. We feel they provide a better gauge of the overall financial 
climate because they include variables that directly affect spending on domestically produced goods and services. Each FCI is 
calculated as a weighted average of a policy rate, a long-term riskless bond yield, a corporate credit spread, an equity price 
variable, and a trade-weighted exchange rate; in the Euro area we also include a sovereign credit spread. The weights mirror the 
effects of the financial variables on real GDP growth in our models over a one-year horizon. 
Global Leading Indicator (GLI) 
Our GLIs provide a more timely reading on the state of the global industrial cycle than the existing alternatives, and in a way that 
is largely independent of market variables. Global cyclical swings are important to a huge range of asset classes; as a result, we 
have come to rely on this consistent leading measure of the global cycle. Over the past few years, our GLI has provided early 
signals on turning points in the global cycle on a number of occasions and has helped confirm or deny the direction in which 
markets were heading. Our GLI currently includes the following components: Consumer Confidence aggregate, Japan IP 
inventory/sales ratio, Korea exports, S&P GS Industrial Metals Index, US Initial jobless claims, Belgian and Netherlands 
manufacturing surveys, Global PMI, GS Australian and Canadian dollar trade weighted index aggregate, Global new orders less 
inventories, Baltic Dry Index.  
Goldman Sachs Analyst Index (GSAI) 
Our US GSAI is based on a monthly survey of Goldman Sachs equity analysts to obtain their assessments of business conditions 
in the industries they follow. The results provide timely “bottom-up” information about US economic activity to supplement and 
cross-check our analysis of “top-down” data. Based on their responses, we create a diffusion index for economic activity 
comparable to the ISM’s indexes for activity in the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. 
Macro-data Assessment Platform (MAP) 
Our MAP scores facilitate rapid interpretation of new data releases. In essence, MAP combines into one simple measure the 
importance of a specific data release (i.e., its historical correlation with GDP) and the degree of surprise relative to the consensus 
forecast. We put a sign on the degree of surprise, so that an underperformance will be characterized with a negative number and 
an outperformance with a positive number. We rank each of these two components on a scale from 0 to 5, and the MAP score 
will be the product of the two, i.e., from -25 to +25. The idea is that when data are released, the assessment we make will 
include a MAP score of, for example, +20 (5;+4)—which would indicate that the data has a very high correlation to GDP (the ‘5’) 
and that it came out well above consensus expectations (the ‘+4’)—for a total MAP value of ‘+20.’ We currently employ MAP for 
US, EMEA and Asia data releases. 
Real-Time Inflation and Activity Framework (RETINA) 
RETINA provides a comprehensive econometric methodology able to filter incoming information from the most up-to-date high 
frequency variables in order to track real GDP growth in the Euro area. Along with a GDP tracker, RETINA also captures the 
interrelated mechanisms of the area-wide pricing chain, providing a short-term view on inflation dynamics. 
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report accurately reflect our personal views, which have not been influenced by considerations of the firm's business or client relationships. 
I, Peter Oppenheimer, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject company or 
companies and its or their securities. I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific 
recommendations or views expressed in this report. 
Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs' Global Investment Research division. 
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circumstances and, if appropriate, seek professional advice, including tax advice. The price and value of investments referred to in this 
research and the income from them may fluctuate. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, 
and a loss of original capital may occur. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived 
from, certain investments. 
Certain transactions, including those involving futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all 
investors. Investors should review current options disclosure documents which are available from Goldman Sachs sales representatives or at 
http://www.theocc.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp. Transaction costs may be significant in option strategies calling for multiple 
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your sales representative or go to http://360.gs.com. 
Disclosure information is also available at http://www.gs.com/research/hedge.html or from Research Compliance, 200 West Street, New York, 
NY 10282. 
© 2017 Goldman Sachs. 
El 
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 26 
Top of Mind Issue 55 
No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied or duplicated in any form by any means or (ii) redistributed without the 
prior written consent of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
 
